The first flight of the L-1011 took place on November 16, 1970, with type certification from the Federal Aviation Administration following on April 14, 1972. Eastern Air Lines began commercial operations with the TriStar later that month between Miami International Airport and John F. Kennedy International Airport.
Approximately 250 L-1011s were produced and delivered globally. Major U.S. operators included Delta Air Lines (70), Eastern Air Lines (44), TWA (41), ATA Airlines (29), while British Airways operated 26 after inheriting them through mergers. Other international carriers such as All Nippon Airways (21), Saudia, Air Canada, Aer Lingus, and Air Transat also used the aircraft.
The TriStar introduced several technological advancements for its time: it was equipped with an integrated drive generator (IDG) and a sophisticated autopilot system; it also featured a distinctive nose landing gear allowing access to more airports. Powered exclusively by three Rolls-Royce RB211 engines—each providing up to 50,000 pounds of thrust—the L-1011 had a typical cruise speed of 515 knots and a range of about 2,680 nautical miles.
Despite these features, engine issues severely impacted its commercial success. Lockheed’s commitment to only one engine supplier left it vulnerable when Rolls-Royce encountered financial trouble in 1971—a situation that resulted in bankruptcy for Rolls-Royce and production delays for Lockheed.
The delay enabled rival McDonnell Douglas’s DC-10—offered with either Pratt & Whitney or General Electric engines—to reach airlines first and secure key orders. The DC-10’s flexibility in engine options made it more attractive for airlines already operating those types of engines.
Lockheed’s limited experience in commercial aviation compared to Boeing or McDonnell Douglas further hampered efforts to win airline contracts. Additionally, unlike competitors who offered freighter versions of their widebody jets, Lockheed did not provide a cargo variant of the TriStar.
While pilots praised its handling characteristics and passengers noted its quiet cabin environment, these strengths were not enough to overcome late market entry or strategic missteps related to engine exclusivity and product offerings.
“Many argued that the L-1011 was superior to the DC-10 in many ways, but because of its late entry into commercial service, Lockheed fell behind in key orders.”
“The delay with the RB211 engine allowed the DC-10 to enter the commercial market first, which allowed the aircraft to capture additional airline orders.”
“The decision to only put the L-1011 into service with one engine made Lockheed more vulnerable to the technical and financial issues surrounding the RB211.”
Overall production ended after about 250 units as sales failed to meet expectations despite technological innovation.